SAML, the XML-based authentication protocol that birthed the SSO industry, is fundamentally flawed due to XML complexity, canonicalization issues, enveloped signatures, and design ossification, making it vulnerable to signature wrapping attacks and parser differentials that persist despite decades of awareness. Organizations should migrate to OpenID Connect (OIDC), which avoids these pitfalls through simpler JSON-based design, detached signatures, and agile evolution.

Before code review even starts, agents let us build custom tooling and formal models. Here’s how six months of building with AI agents helped us find real issues in our Miden zkVM audit.

1Password’s benchmark misrepresents AI patching. We share real-world data on human and agent patch quality from our consulting work and Patch the Planet and release two agent skills for testing and reviewing security fixes.

Fermat’s margin was too narrow for his proof. Ours would have fit just fine, thanks to a wonderfully cursed Lean bug.

You can no longer assume a mere VM will contain a sufficiently advanced AI agent.

We found and reported a bug in Provenance Blockchain, a public proof-of-stake chain built on Cosmos SDK, that lets any user grant themselves admin control over marker accounts without holding a single token.

Signal recently launched Automatic Key Verification, a feature that helps validate that your chats are secure without requiring direct safety number comparison. Trail of Bits built and operates one of the three auditors that make this system trustworthy.

This blog post details security risks to consider when integrating AWS Nitro Enclaves with AWS KMS.

This blog post identifies seven recurring failure patterns in application and hook code, including missing caller checks and accounting bugs that still satisfy the PoolManager’s settlement invariant.

Over the first few weeks of Patch the Planet, our engineers found three techniques for using /goal, which hands Codex an open-ended objective and lets it work independently toward a success condition.

We’ve added a new chapter to our Testing Handbook: a comprehensive guide to security testing Rust programs.

In April we released Mewt, our open-source mutation-testing engine that finds the gaps in your test suite. Today we’re expanding it with support for DAML, the language Canton Network applications are written in.

A Patch the Planet field report: GPT-5.5-Cyber built a bespoke zlib fuzzing campaign in a single day, work that once took skilled researchers weeks.

We added post-quantum cryptography support to pyca/cryptography, the eleventh most-downloaded Python package on PyPI, putting quantum-resistant ML-KEM and ML-DSA algorithms one pip install away for the entire Python ecosystem.

Patch the Planet is our joint initiative with OpenAI to assist critical open-source software in the age of machine-speed vulnerability research.

We found hundreds of weak RSA and DSA keys with biased bits that we could quickly factor using a new polynomial-based cryptanalytic technique.

We recently bypassed ClawHub’s malicious skill detector, Cisco’s agent skill scanner, and all three of the scanners integrated into skills.sh.

We improved YAML anchor support in zizmor and tested it against 41,253 real-world GitHub Actions workflows from high-value open-source projects.

We built gosentry, a fuzzing-oriented fork of the Go toolchain that keeps the standard fuzzing workflow while using a stronger stack underneath.

Here is a walkthrough of our solutions to two C/C++ security challenges from the new C/C++ chapter in the Testing Handbook: a Linux ping program with an inet_ntoa global buffer gotcha and command injection, and a Windows driver with registry type confusion bugs that can escalate from local DoS to a kernel write primitive.

We added LibAFL support to Ruzzy, our coverage-guided fuzzer for pure Ruby code and Ruby C extensions. This gives Ruby developers and security researchers access to a more advanced and actively maintained fuzzing engine without changing how they write their fuzzing harnesses.

Trailmark turns source code into a security-analysis graph, powering eight Claude Code skills for blast radius, taint propagation, and mutation test triage.

Trail of Bits discovered and exploited memory safety and logic vulnerabilities in Google’s Rust zero-knowledge proof code to forge a proof claiming better quantum circuit performance metrics than Google’s original results, demonstrating unique security risks in zkVM systems.

We released a new Testing Handbook chapter providing a comprehensive security checklist for C and C++ code review, covering Linux, Windows, and seccomp environments.

Our audit of WhatsApp’s new “Private Inference” feature shows that trusted execution environments (TEEs) aren’t a silver bullet.